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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AITDREY w. TAYLOR' et al. ' 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, et al., 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Consolidated Cases 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~-) 
JOSEPH FAZZIO, et al. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~-) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
No. 19160 
and 
No. 19161 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-appellants Audrey W. Taylor, Maxine T. 
Fazzio, Joseph Fazzio, and Fuel Exploration, Inc. appeal from 
judgments of the Seventh Judicial District Court for Uintah 
'•unty, the Honorable Richard C.· Davidson presiding, dismissing 
~mended complaints in these actions, which are now 
-~l1dated for purposes of appeal. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellants commenced these actions in the District 
Court on May 19, 1982, seeking, among other things, to 
terminate the leasehold rights of Phillips Petroleum Company in 
land located in Uintah County. (R. 13; R. 16.)* Appellants 
amended ther complaints on June 4 and June 10, 1982. (R. 48; 
R. 54.) On July 26, 1982, Phillips moved to dismiss 
appellants' First through Fourth Causes of Action in Case No. 
19160 and, on similar grounds, moved to dismiss appellants' 
First through Sixth Causes of Action in Case No. 19161. 
(R. 91; R. 107.) At the close of oral argument on November 9, 
1982, the District Court invited the parties to make any 
additional submissions they deemed advisable. (Tr. 55.) On 
October 20, 1982, appellants submitted additional materials 
pursuant to the District Court's invitation. (R. 211-30 in 
Case No. 19161.) On December 30, 1982, the District court 
entered judgment granting Phillips' motions to dismiss in their 
entirety. (R. 260 in Case No. 19161.) On January 14, 1983, 
* Where references are made to the records on appeal of both 
consolidated cases, the first reference will be to the 
record in Case No. 19160; the second reference will be to 
the record in Case No. 19161. The transcript of the 
District Court hearing in these cases. which appears at page 
123 of the record in Case No. 19160, will be designated 
"Tr." 
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appellants filed a "Motion to Reconsider" (R. 131; R. 339) and 
a Motion to Amend (R. 133; R. 316) in both cases. On February 
8. 1983, the District Court orally advised counsel for 
appellants that these motions would be denied. (R. 296 in Case 
No. 19161.) On the same day, the District Court certified its 
judgments for appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (R. 124; R. 293.) Notices of appeal were 
filed on March 7, 1983. (R. 151; R. 369.) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Phillips seeks an order of the Court affirming the 
judgments of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statements of facts contained in the appellants' two 
briefs in these cases are unnecessarily confusing, in part 
because of appellants' curious decision to make two lawsuits 
out of this dispute instead of one. Both actions involve the 
same oil and gas lease; both turn on the same questions of 
law. Appellants' statements of facts are also misleading 
because they include certain facts that are completely 
immaterial and omit others that are both undisputed and 
essential to the decision of this Court. 
The following, therefore, is a summary of the undisputed 
Facts in the record before the District Court: 
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1. The 1946 Lease Between the Parties 
On November 30, 1945, Wilford L. Whitlock am:l Leslie 
D. Taylor, together with their wives. entered into two oil and 
gas leases with Phillips, as lessor. (R. 49; R 55.) About 
one year later, on November 10, 1946, Leslie D. Taylor and his 
wife and Nellie Whitlock (individually and on behalf of the 
estate of the deceased Wilford L. Whitlock) entered into 
another oil and gas lease with Phillips. (R. 59; R. 65.) The 
1946 lease was, by its terms, "in correction and in lieu of" 
the two 1945 leases. (R. 63; R. 69.) As a substitute for the 
two earlier leases, the 1946 lease in effect reduced the leased 
acreage from 680 acres to 260 acres and leased certain lands 
not covered in the 1945 leases. The 1946 lease also diminished 
the annual rental due the lessors from $105.00 to $65.00 
Three of the provisions of the 1946 lease are of 
special importance. First, the habendum clause provided for a 
"primary term" of six years from November 12, 1946. The same 
clause provided also that the lease would remain in effect for 
as long after the expiration of the primary term "as oil or gas 
or casinghead gas or either or any of them, is produced" from 
the premises described in the lease. (R. 60; R. 66.) Second. 
paragraph 12 in the lease provided in pertinent part. 
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"Lessee shall have the right to unitize 
. . . all or any part of the above 
described lands with other lands in the 
same general area . . . and in such 
event, the terms, conditions and 
provisions of this lease shall be 
modified to conform to the terms, 
conditions and provisions of such 
approved . . . unit plan of develpoment 
... and, particularly, all drilling 
and development requirements of this 
lease, express or implied, shall be 
satisfied by compliance with the 
drilling and development requirements 
of such plan or agreement, and this 
lease shall not terminate or expire 
during the life of such plan or 
agreement." (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 61; R. 67) Third, paragraph 17 of the 1946 lease provided: 
"It is agreed that this lease shall 
never be forfeited or cancelled for 
failure to perform in whole or part any 
of its implied covenants, conditions, or 
stipulations until it shall have first 
been finally judicially determined that 
such failure exists, and after such 
final determination, lessee is given a 
reasonable time therefrom to comply with 
any such covenants, conditions or 
stipulations." (R. 62; R. 68.) 
2. The 1950 Roosevelt Unit Agreement 
In 1950, pursuant to the 1946 lease's unitization 
clause in paragraph 12, Phillips entered into a Unit Agreement, 
by which it committed the leased lands to the Roosevelt Unit. 
(R 136 in Case No 19161. Paragraph 16(b) of the Unit 
Agreement. dated November 7, 1950, provided: 
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"Drilling and producing operations 
performed hereunder upon any tract of 
unitized lands will be accepted and 
deemed to be performed upon and for 
the benefit of each and every tract of 
unitized land, and no lease shall be 
deemed to expire by re~son of failure 
to drill or to produce wells situated 
on land therein embraced." 
(R. 141 in Case No. 19161.) Paragraph 16(d) provided: 
"Each lease . . of any land 
committed to this agreement, which, 
by its terms might expire prior to 
the termination of this agreement, is 
hereby extended beyond any such term 
so provided therein so that it shall 
be continued in full force and effect 
for and during the term of this 
agreement, subject to the rental 
provisions of paragraph 13 hereof." 
(Id.) Section 13 of the Unit Agreement provided in pertinent 
part that the lessees of privately owned land committed to the 
Roosevelt Unit would, as to leased lands lying outside the unit 
boundaries, continue to pay the appropriate percentage of the 
"delay rentals" specified in the lease as the means of 
continuing the lease "in effect beyond the primary term." (Id.) 
The initial participating area of the Roosevelt Unit 
contained all of the lands leased under the 1946 lease. 
Effective February 1, 1952, and with the approval of the United 
States Department of Interior, the participating area was 
contracted to exclude a portion of the leased premises. (~ee 
Appellants' Brief, Case No. 19161, at p. 7.) About six weeks 
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later, on March 11, 1952, Nellie Whitlock, Leslie D. Taylor and 
~udrey W. Taylor executed an "Agreement" in which they (1) 
acknowledged that Phillips' execution of the Roosevelt Unit 
Agreement was "a proper and binding action" under paragraph 12 
of the 1946 lease, (2) ratified and approved the terms of the 
Unit Agreement, and (3) confirmed the 1946 lease as modified by 
the Unit Agreement. (R. 148-49 in Case. No. 19161.) 
Production of oil and gas in the Roosevelt Unit began 
with the effective date of the Unit Agreement in 1950 (R. 225 
in Case No. 19161) and has continued without interruption to 
the present. 
3. The 1954 Lease Between the Parties 
On October 25, 1954, Phillips entered into another oil 
and gas lease with the same lessors, that is, Mr. and Mrs. 
Taylor and Mrs. Whitlock. (R. 71 in Case No. 19161.) Although 
this 1954 lease covered a portion of the property covered by 
the 1946 lease, it did not refer to the 1946 lease. Several 
months later, on April 8, 1955, Phillips executed a release of 
its rights under the 1954 lease. (R. 74 in Case No. 19161.) 
This document, entitled "Release of Oil and Gas Leases," 
provided: 
"This instrument shall not be 
construed to effect a release of any 
rights which the undersigned 
[Phillips] may hold in any lands not 
specifically described in Exh1b1t 
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'A' or under any oil and gas lease 
or leases not specifically described 
in Exhibit 'A' whether or not such 
lease or leases cove~ lands 
des er i ~ed_}n_ Exhj !?i! •A• . " 
(R. 74 in Case No. 19161; emphasis added.) Exhibit "A" to the 
Release referred to the 1954 lease but did not refer to the 
1946 lease between Phillips and the Whitlock and Taylor 
lessors. (R. 76 in Case No. 19161.) 
4. Appellants' Demand for Release of 
Acreage Covered by the 1946 Lease 
Appellants Fazzio and Taylor are successors in 
interest to the original lessors under the 1946 lease. From 
the early 1950's to the present Phillips has paid or tendered 
to appellants or their predecessors (1) royalties for their 
percentage of production from the Roosevelt Unit and (2) delay 
rentals on leased lands lying outside the Roosevelt Unit, all 
in accordance with the terms of the 1946 lease as modified by 
the Unit Agreement. In October 1981, appellants' former 
attorney, Mr. Carl H. Noel, demanded a release of Phillips' 
rights under the 1946 lease and directed Phillips not to 
continue payment of delay rentals. (R. 152 in Case No. 
19161.) As indicated above, however, Phillips has continued t: 
tender delay rentals to appellants to the present. (R. 281 in 
Case No. 19161.) 
At no time until the filing of these actions did 
appellants, their predecessors or their attorneys tell Phi 1 '' 
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ti!at it was in violation of any implied covenant under the 1946 
1ed,~ ,r demand compliance with any such implied covenant. 
ARGUMENT 
In these actions, appellants have challenged the 
validity of an oil and gas lease that has been of record for 
more than 36 years. Phillips has performed its obligations 
under the 1946 lease from its inception to the present, and, 
until recently. appellants or their predecessors have accepted 
all of the benefits of Phillips' performance. Although 
appellants urge the Court to find disputed factual issues, this 
appeal hinges entirely upon the plain terms of the 1946 lease 
as modified by the Roosevelt Unit Agreement, which the original 
lessors ratified and adopted. 
In its motions to dismiss below, Phillips properly 
submitted to the District Court materials either specifically 
referred to in the Amended Complaints (that is, the Roosevelt 
Unit Agreement and Carl H. Noel's 1981 letter to Phillips) or 
closely related to the allegations in the Amended Complaint 
(that is, the lessors' 1952 Ratification of the Roosevelt Unit 
Agreement). The District Court properly considered these 
materials and, further, gave appellants opportunity to submit 
"ddit1onal materials on pertinent issues. In doing so, the 
11 1st,1cr court complied with the directive of Rule 12_, Utah 
Jf Civil Pr_oc_e_dure: 
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"If, on a motion asserting defense 
numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of 
the pleading to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to 
and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one ror 
summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity 
~esent all material made pertinent 
to such a motion by Rule 56." 
(Emphasis added.) The District court, then, properly treated 
Phillips' motions as motions for summary judgment, and this 
Court's review of the judgments below must observe the standard 
of review applicable to judgments entered under Rule 56. 
Under Rule 56(e), a party opposing summary judgment 
may not rest upon "mere allegations or denials in his pleading, 
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
[Rule 56), must set forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial." If the opposing party does not 
respond with specific facts properly supported, "summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him." Rule 
56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That is precisely what 
happened in these cases. Appellants submitted materials to the 
District Court that wholly ignored the critical issues. 
Appellants failed to demonstrate the existence of a material 
and disputed factual issue. and judgment was correctly entered 
against them. 
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I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD 
THAT APPELLANTS' CLAIMS BASED UPON 
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF IMPLIED 
COVENANTS ARE NOT ACTIONABLE 
The central issue raised by appellants is whether they 
may sue Phillips for breach of implied covenants under the 1946 
lease, where this Court has never recognized the existence of 
such implied covenants, where appellants never gave Phillips 
notice of any such breach or the opportunity to cure (indeed 
where appellants' only notice to Phillips contradicted their 
reliance on implied covenants), and where the lease itself 
negates an action based on implied covenants. In their Fifth 
and Sixth Causes of Action in Case No. 19161 and the Third and 
Fourth Causes of Action in Case No. 19160, appellants alleged 
that Phillips breached "an implied covenant to further develop 
the leasehold property" and "an implied covenant of further 
exploration." The District Court held that appellants failed 
to give Phillips either adequate notice of the alleged breach 
or an opportunity to cure any such breach. (R. 121; 259.) In 
daing so, the District court selected only one of several 
•easnns presented to it why these claims were not actionable as 
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a matter of law. We submit that for any of the following 
reasons, the District Court's ruling on the implied covenants 
claims should be affirmed.* 
A. Appellants Failed to Give 
Phillips Notice of Breach and 
the Opportunity to Cure, As a 
Matter of Law 
Appellants' implied covenant claims are fundamentally 
inconsistent with other claims in these cases in which 
appellants assert that Phillips' leasehold long ago terminated 
or was never lawfully obtained. Appellants cannot consistently 
say (as in their implied covenant claims) that Phillips should 
have done more on the leasehold, while at the same time saying 
(as they do in other claims) that Phillips has had no right to 
do anything on the leasehold. Appellants may arguably elect to 
enforce implied covenants or to insist upon termination, but 
they may not do both. See, e.g., Indian Territory Operating 
Co. v. Bridge Petroleum Co., 500 F. Supp. 499, 451 (W.D. Okla. 
* This Court has held that when a district court's ruling is 
correct, it will be affirmed even though the district court 
may have stated insufficient grounds to support it. See, 
~. Tree----"'-'--White, 110 Utah 223, 171 P 2d 398 (1946). 
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1980) (holding that the lessor waived its right to claim 
termination of an oil and gas lease by demanding that the 
i~ssee comply with the lease's implied covenants). 
To protect lessees from the risks entailed in acting on 
such inconsistent claims, the law requires the lessor to notify 
the lessee of his breach. Specifically, the courts in every 
jurisdiction to consider the question have held that, as a 
minimal prerequisite to suit for enforcement of implied 
covenants under an oil and gas lease, the lessor must prove 
that he gave the lessee notice of the breach and a reasonable 
opportunity after notice to effect a cure. See, e.g., Superior 
Oil Co. v. Devon Corp. 604 F.2d 1063, 1069-72 (8th Cir. 1979) 
("[A]n oil and gas lease will not be cancelled for breach of an 
implied covenant without the lessor having first given the 
lessee notice of the breach and demanding that the terms of the 
implied covenant be complied with within a reasonable time.''); 
V!Bc.f'!i:i_t v. Tideway Oil Programs, Inc., 620 P.2d 910, 916 (Okla. 
App. 1980); Robinson v. Continental Oil Co., 255 F. Supp. 61, 
64 (D. Kan. 1966); Savoy. v. Tidewater Oil Co., 218 F. Supp. 
607, 610 (W. D. La. 1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1964); 
Montana Easterp EiJ:>elinLlo. v. Shell Oil Co., 216 F. Supp. 
214, 221 (D. Mont. 1963), aff'd, 342 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1965); 
Kunc v Har~er~Jurne~_Oil Co., 297 P.2d 371, 377-78 (Okla. 
:',f, Martin v_G~~f. 158 S.W.2d 637 (Ky. 1942). 
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Presumably with the foregoing authorities in mind, 
appellants alleged in their Amended Complaints that their 
attorney, Carl H. Noel, notified Phillips of the two alleged 
breaches of implied covenants in his demand letter of October 
19, 1980. (R. 42; R. 48.) Carl Noel's demand letter of that 
date (R. 151 in Case No. 19161), however, does not mention any 
breach of any implied covenant, does not mention any implied 
covenant, and certainly does not demand compliance with any 
such covenant within a reasonable time. Instead, Mr. Noel's 
letter complains of Phillips' "outrageous conduct" in 
"proliferat[ing] quite a litter of leases" and demands release 
of the 1946 lease on the basis of fraud and other theories 
presented in the Amended Complaint. 
Although this Court has not considered the question, 
authorities in other jurisdictions hold that such a demand does 
not satisfy the oil and gas lessor's obligation to give notice 
of the breach and an opportunity to cure. Professor Summers 
has stated in this regard: 
"[B]efore the lessor can secure 
cancellation of a lease for breach of an 
implied covenant he must put the lessee 
in default by giving the lessee notice 
that compliance with the particular 
covenant is required and allowing the 
lessee a reasonable time within which to 
comply . The notice in such cases 
must:_ be unequivoc-al and be addresse:::: tQ 
th_e current situation It must embcJdy_;, 
demand for-fu_gher __ de·:elopment within ~ 
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I_easo~able time under pain of 
forfeiture; a notice which attempts to 
declare an immediate forfeiture is 
ineffective." 
w.L Summers, Law of Oil & Gas §469 (1958) (emphasis added). 
The present cases are closely similar to Kunc v. 
~arper-Turner Oil Co., 297 P.2d 371 (Okla. 1956), in which 
plaintiff lessor contended that defendant lessee had breached 
its obligation to develop an oil and gas lease in a reasonably 
prudent manner. Defendant countered that no notice of its 
alleged breach had been given. Plaintiff replied that its 
letter, which demanded a release of the leased acreage, was 
adequate notice. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's conclusion that plaintiff's notice was legally 
insufficient: 
"The notice given to the lessee ... 
simply notified the defendant that it 
had forfeited and allowed to lapse and 
abandoned the lease and demanded that 
it be released of record and that entry 
or operation upon the land would 
constitute a trespass ... 
"This notice certainly does not 
constitute notice to further develop, 
but in fact forbids any further effort 
in that direction." 
2g7 P 2d at 377. The Kunc court concluded: 
"The rule is well established that 
where lessors seek the cancellation of 
a lease on the ground that it has not 
been properly developed. the lessors 
must give notice ~hat they demand the 
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drilling of an additional well or wells 
and that failure to comply by the 
lessee will result in an action to 
declare the undeveloped portion of the 
lease forfeited and cancelled, and that 
the lessee is entitled to a reasonable 
time after such notice ~o commence 
operations to comply with the notice 
and demand." 
Id. at 377-78. Accord: Sadler v. Public National Bank & Trust 
fQ_,_, 172 F.2d 870, 875 (10th Cir. 1949) (holding that a 
"written demand that the lease be released of record" could not 
"take the place of the required not ice of demand to develop."). 
Phillips does not contend, as appellants state, that 
the law requires a particular form of notice to the lessee. We 
simply urge that the law requires some notice of default and 
some demand for further development or exploration as 
prerequisites to a suit based upon the alleged breach of an 
implied covenant under an oil and gas lease. If Carl Noel's 
letter was adequate notice and demand, as appellants contend. 
then every oil lessee in this State will be required to risk 
the enormous sums entailed in development of oil wells in the 
face of the lessor's unequivocal statement that the lessee's 
interest is nonexistent and that he has no right to conduct 
operations on the leasehold. Mr. Noel's letter, in short. feil 
short of the required notice because it effectively forbade 
Phillips from further occupation of the leasehold. Appellants 
were unable to produce any other evidence suggesting the tvpe 
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of notice or demand required by the authorities. The District 
tourt therefore correctly entered judgment for Phillips on the 
breach of implied covenant claims. 
B. The Unitization Clause in the 
1946 Lease Precludes Suit For 
Breach of Implied Covenants 
Even more fundamentally, the 1946 lease itself 
precludes appellants' claims for breach of implied covenants. 
Paragraph 12 of the lease (quoted at length at page 5 of this 
brief) authorized Phillips to unitize "all or any part" of the 
leased lands. In the event of unitization, paragraph 12 
continues, "all drilling or development requirements of this 
lease, express or implied, shall be satisfied by compliance 
with the drilling and development requirements" of the 
unitization agreement. Paragraph 12 concludes the matter as 
follows: "[T]his lease shall not terminate or expire during 
the life of such [unitization] plan or agreement." 
Appellants have never contended that Phillips failed 
to comply with the terms of the Roosevelt Unit Agreement. To 
the contrary, appellants' contention is that compliance with 
the Roosevelt Unit Agreement is not enough to discharge 
Phillips' implied covenants under the lease. The implied 
covendnt claims flatly contradict the parties' agreement in 
~~rAgraph 12 of the lease. The original parties to the lease 
·~J that Phillips' leasehold would continue for the life of 
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the Roosevelt Unit, and appellants cannot enforce a different 
arrangement by reference to the alleged violation of implied 
covenants which are fully satisfied, according to the lease 
C. The Judicial Ascertainment 
Clause in the 1946 Lease 
Precludes Appellants' Implied 
Covenant Claims 
Under paragraph 17 of the 1946 lease (quoted in full 
at page 5 of this brief), the most that appellants could 
request of the District Court is a determination that a breach 
occurred and a direction that, within a reasonable time after 
judgment, the breach must be cured or Phillips will lose its 
rights under the lease. Appellants may not seek immediate 
forfeiture or damages, which were the only remedies requested 
in the Amended Complaints. 
Paragraph 17 of the 1946 lease is known in the oil and 
gas industry as a "judicial ascertainment clause" and is 
common. See 4 H.R. __ \,Ji_lUarns & L_.L_Mejlers, Oil_&Gas Law §682 
(1981). According to Williams and Myers, judicial 
ascertainment clauses are generally enforced as written 
"Where cancellation is made of a lease with a judicial 
ascertainment clause, the decree will typically be 
conditioned: that is. the decree will provide for cancell3t10~ 
unless the lessee within a stated period complies with his 
obligations." Id. §682 1. 
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Where, as here, the lessor asks not for such a 
·:11ditional decree, but for immediate cancellation and damages, 
ht fails to state an actionable claim. In Keuhne v. Samedan 
01L~· 626 P.2d 1035 (Wyo. 1981), the Wyoming Supreme Court 
considered the effect of a judicial ascertainment clause like 
paragraph 17 of the present lease, in a dispute that is 
identical to the present one. The lessors there alleged that 
the lessee had violated implied covenants to further develop 
and further explore on leased lands lying outside a producing 
unit. The remedy they sought was cancellation. The trial 
c0urt awarded summary judgment for the lessee. On appeal, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed: 
"[The judicial ascertainment clause] 
could not more clearly state that 
the only way to approach the problem 
of implied covenants is to seek a 
final judicial determination that 
there is a failure to perform or a 
default by lessee of some implied 
covenant and the lessee is afforded 
a reasonable time after that to 
correct any breach or default found 
to exist. There is no question that 
such a final judicial determination 
has not been made and if made that 
appellees have not been accorded a 
reasonable opportunity to correct 
the default. Until these conditions 
precedent_ have- b~~n m_e_t--;-tliere can 
be no termination, forfeiture or 
canceTlat ion -o£tfle-iease.and no 
genuine issue-2F m-atf_r_iaftact 
exists." 
'rl at 1040 (emphasis added). 
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These authorities likewise compel the conclusion that 
the District Court's judgment should be affirmed. 
II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD 
THAT APPELLANTS' FRAUD ALLEGATIONS 
FAILED TO STATE AN ACTIONABLE CLAIM 
In the First Cause of Action of both Amended 
Complaints below, appellants contended that the 1946 lease was 
induced by an act of fraud allegedly committed about 37 years 
ago. The crux of this claim is that the 1945 leases were 
invalid because Phillips was "not authorized to do business in 
the State of Utah" when they were executed in 1945, and that 
Phillips "only became authorized to do business" in Utah in 
June, 1946. Appellants claim that Phillips induced their 
predecessors to execute the 1946 lease for the undisclosed 
purpose of validating the 1945 leases and that Phillips never 
told its lessors that the 1945 leases were "void." In short, 
appellants alleged that Phillips fraudulently omitted to state 
a "fact" -- that the 1945 leases were void and thereby 
fraudulently obtained the signatures of Mr. and Mrs. Taylor and 
Mrs. Whitlock on the 1946 lease. 
Phillips need not explain all of the reasons why this 
fraud claim is implausible The 1945 leases and the 1946 le3se 
contain significantly different terms and in part cover 
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~1fferent pieces of property. The differences between these 
1eases indicate that the real reason for the 1946 lease was to 
enable the parties to strike a·different deal. Appellants' 
predecessors plainly wanted to enter into the 1946 lease, 
because they did it. This alone suggests that Phillips' 
previous qualification status would have been of no importance 
to the lessors. But apart from the extreme unlikelihood of 
appellants' fraud allegations, and even apart from the 
equitable problems entailed in their seeking to rescind a lease 
under which Phillips has continuously performed for 37 years, 
appellants' fraud claims are barred, as a matter of law, for 
any of four independent reasons. The District court held that 
these claims were barred, as a matter of law, by the statute of 
limitations. (R. 120; R. 258.) In doing so, the District 
court again selected only one of several sound reasons for 
dismissal presented to it. 
A. The Fraud Claims Are Barred By 
the Statute of Limitations, As 
a Matter of Law 
Section 78-12-26(3), Utah Code Ann. (1977 Repl. Vol.), 
establishes a three year limitations period for actions based 
on fraud The period of limitations begins to run "from the 
time when a reasonably prudent person would have acted ~nd 
''''"'''DV discovered" the alleged fraud. Smith v. Edwards, 81 
Jq4. 258, 17 P.2d 264, 270 (1932). This Court's recent 
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cases have further held that where the plaintiff has the 
Gpportunity to discover the mistake or fraud and fails to mare 
ieasonable inquiry. the three-year statute of limitations runs 
from the time he had opportunity. In McConkie v. Hartman, 529 
P.2d 801 (Utah 1974), plaintiffs claimed that they did not 
discover the existence of fraudulent mineral reservations in 
deeds assigned to them until shortly before they commenced the 
action; they relied upon evidence indicating that they did not 
have possession of the deeds or examine them until then. This 
Court held, however, that plaintiffs had "full opportunity to 
discover the reservations in the deeds" when they were placed 
in the possession of an escrow, more than eight years before 
the filing of the action. The court said: "[A]ll of the 
circumstances existing at or about the time the deeds were 
recorded were such as to furnish full opportunity to the 
plaintiffs for the discovery of the mistake or fraud, if any 
existed." 529 P.2d at 802. Accord: Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 
P.2d 50 (Utah 1978); McKellar v. McKellar, 23 Utah 2d 106, 458 
P.2d 867 (1969). 
In 1945, the filings required of foreign corporations 
doing business in Utah were maintained. pursuant to statute, i~. 
hoth the office of the County Clerk and the off ice of the 
Secretary of State. See Utah Code Ann §18-8-1 (1943) Thus 
appellants' predecessors had easy access to information 
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,plating to Phillips' qualification to do business in Utah --
,, ~h1llips' status in that regard mattered to them at all. If 
fh1Jlips' qualification or failure to qualify was material to 
Mt and Mrs. Taylor and Mrs. Whitlock, they should at least 
have consulted the County Record to learn the truth. Having 
failed to do so, they and their predecessors are barred from 
seeking relief for the alleged fraud more than three decades 
later, as a matter of law. 
B. The Fraud Claims Do Not Involve 
a Misrepresentation of Fact 
Appellants' fraud theory hangs entirely on Phillips' 
alleged failure to offer its lessors what amounts to a legal 
QI>inion as to the validity of its 1945 leases. As of 1946 (the 
year of the alleged fraud), Phillips' capacity or lack of 
capacity to execute binding Utah leases in 1945 was far from 
certain, depending upon such factors as the amount of business 
Phillips transacted in Utah before 1945 and the burden on 
interstate commerce resulting from any state-imposed 
disability. ~~~~. Marchant v. National Reserve Co., 103 
Utah 530, 137 P.2d 331 (1943) (holding that for a foreign 
corp•Jrat1on to be "doing business" in Utah, and therefore to 
subject itself to Utah's requirements for qualification, the 
·'''l"··rat1on must have been engaged in "a continuing course of 
,, .. ,. · 1 n the state rather than "a few isolated 
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transactions"); William C. Moore & Co. v. Sanchez, 6 Utah 2d 
J09, 313 P.2d 461 (1957) (holding Utah's foreign corporation 
qualification act unconstitutional as applied to transactions 
in interstate commerce). Since 1961, the law in Utah has been 
that the "failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a 
certificate of authority to transact business in this state 
shall not impair the validity of any contract or act of such 
corporation." Utah Code Ann. §16-10-120 (1973 Repl. Vol.). In 
other words, the "fact" allegedly misrepresented to appellants' 
predecessors has not been a "fact" for more than 20 years in 
this state. 
These considerations underscore the wisdom of the rule 
that actionable fraud entails the misrepresentation of a 
presently existing fact. A misrepresentation of law or an 
omission to disclose a legal conclusion -- such as that the 
1945 leases were invalid -- is never actionable as fraud. As 
this Court held in Ackerman v. Bramwell Investment Co., 80 Utah 
52, 60, 12 P.2d 623, 626 (1932), "The general rule is that 
misprepresentations of law or of the legal effect of contracts 
and writings do not constitute remedial fraud." Accord: 
Pleasants v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Assoc~tion, 569 P.2d 
261, 264 (Ariz. App. 1977); First_ll~i_o_~L~ant_j.._J_r\1~1:_~0-'-\' 
Musko~Discpunt House. 382 P.2d 137, 139 (Okla. 1963). The 
rule should apply with greater force where, as here, the 
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alleged fraud consisted in Phillips' alleged failure to 
disclose a very questionable conclusion of law. The District 
Court correctly dismissed the fraud claims because appellants 
failed to allege the misrepresentation or omission of a 
material fact. 
C. Appellants Failed to Allege 
Facts Forming the Basis of a 
Duty to Speak 
Appellants failed to allege facts that would justify 
charging Phillips with the duty to disclose its authoriziation 
to do business in Utah. A fraudulent omission is actionable 
only where the defendant had a duty to disclose the facts 
omitted. Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 
1373 (Utah 1980). Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, required 
appellants to plead each of the elements of fraud with 
particularity, including the basis for any such duty to speak. 
For this additional reason, the District Court's dismissal 
should be affirmed. 
D. Most Appellants Lack Standing To 
Sue Phillips for Fraud 
With the exception of appellant Audrey W. Taylor, who 
was one of Phillips' original lessors, all of the appellants 
lack standing to assert the fraud claims. Appellants cannot 
maintain an action for fraud as to their predecessors in 
,,,teiest where they themselves have not been defrauded. In 
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Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962), this Court 
affirmed dismissal of a claim of fraud in the sale of real 
property on the ground that the defenuant seller's alleged 
misrepresentation was made to an intermediate purchaser rather 
than to plaintiff, who was a remote purchaser of the property. 
In language directly pertinent to the present cases, Ellis held 
"If a person fraudulently makes a 
misrepresentation of facts to another 
with the intent that it will be 
transmitted to a third person, the 
latter may have a cause of action 
against the misrepresenter. The 
instant complaint fails to allege 
that [defendant] intended the 
misrepresentation to be transmitted 
to [plaintiff] or anyone else and 
must, therefore, fail." 
13 Utah 2d at 283, 373 P.2d at 385. Accord: Sponseller v. 
Meltebeke, 570 P.2d 974, 975 (Ore. 1977); Peerless Mills, Inc. 
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 527 F.2d 445, 449-50 (2nd Cir. 
1975); Atlantic Bank v. Sutton Associates, Inc., 321 N.Y.S. 2d 
380, 381 (App. Div. 1971); Metric Investments, Inc. v. 
Patterson, 244 A.2d 311, 315 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1968). 
As in Ellis and these other authorities, appellants 
failed to allege that they relied upon or were otherwise induced 
to take action by Phillips' alleged nondisclosure, in 1946, of 
its qualification status in 1945. It is simply incredible to 
suppose, moreover, that the "fact" allegedly omitted has ever 
been of any importance to anyone but appellants' lawyers In 
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Jny event, the District Court's judgment should be affirmed for 
~his additional reason. 
III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD 
THAT THE 1946 LEASE WAS VALID 
In the Second Cause of Action of both Amended 
Complaints below, apellants asserted that the 1946 lease was 
void ab initio. They claimed that the 1946 lease was no more 
than "a corrective conveyance" and, as such, "related back to" 
the 1945 leases, which they claimed were void because Phillips 
was not qualified to do business in Utah when it executed 
them. Although Phillips was unquestionably qualified to do 
business in Utah when it executed the 1946 lease, that lease 
could never be valid, appellants asserted, because it merely 
corrected the allegedly void 1945 leases. The District Court 
rejected this theory on the ground that the 1946 lease did not 
"relate back" to the 1945 leases. Rather, the 1946 lease, 
embodying different terms, was "in lieu of" -- was substituted 
for -- the earlier leases. The District Court concluded that 
the 1946 lease, according to its unambiguous language, 
constituted a new arrangement between the parties and could not 
be impaired by reason of Phillips' alleged lack of capacity to 
1xecute previous conveyances in this state. (R. 120; R. 258.) 
The 1946 lease states: "This is in correction and in 
'' ,,f two leases both dated November 30, 1945 .... " 
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~R.63; R. 69.) The parties c-ould not have more clearly statej 
their intention to replace the 1945 leases with the 1946 
lease. Appellants' present suggestion that the lease is 
ambiguous in this regard -- requiring the presentation 6f 
extrinsic evidence of intent -- ignores the plain meaning of 
the words of the lease. 
But there is an even more compelling reason why the 
District Court's dismissal of the Second Cause of Action must 
be affirmed: under Utah law neither the 1946 lease nor the 
1945 leases could be held void for Phillips' alleged failure to 
comply with Utah's 1945 qualification statutes. As indicated 
earlier in this brief, "The failure of a foreign corporation tc 
obtain a certificate of authority to transact business in this 
state shall_E.2!_jmpair the validity_Qf_a!!Y_contract or ac_t--2.f 
such corporation . Utah__Cod.euAnn. §16-10-120 (1973 
Repl. Vol.) (emphasis added). Appellants' Second Cause of 
Action proceeded from the incorrect premise that the District 
Court might negate the lease of a foreign corporation solely t~ 
reason of its failure to obtain a certificate of authority to 
do business. The Legislature has unconditionally prohibited 
the courts from doing so These claims were properly dism1si·· 
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IV. 
TEE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD 
THAT PHILLIPS DID NOT RELEASE ITS 
JUGHTS-uNDER TEE 1946 LEASE 
The Third Cause of Action in Case No. 19161 claims 
that Phillips' 1955 release of its rights under the 1954 lease 
effectively released the 1946 lease as well. The two-step 
theory behind this contention is (1) that the 1946 lease 
"merged" into the 1954 lease by operation of law, and (2) in 
later releasing the 1954 leasehold, Phillips gave up all of the 
rights it ever acquired from the Taylors and Whitlocks. Thus, 
according to appellants, the 1946 lease has been a nullity 
since 1955. A number of questions naturally come to mind. Why 
did it take the lessors 27 years to decide that Phillips has no 
leasehold 7 Why did appellants or their predecessors accept 
royalty and rental checks for nearly three decades if the 1946 
lease was a nullity? Why do appellants now insist that 
Phillips should have done more to develop the leasehold if the 
leasehold has not existed for more than 27 years? 
The District Court rejected the Third Cause of Action 
~n two grounds. First, the 1954 lease did not include all of 
the lands covered by the 1946 lease, was a separate and 
~'S'1nct lease, and nothing "merged" into it. Second, 
'rs' release of the 1954 lease explicitly related only to 
'• ise and left the 1946 lease undisturbed. (R. 259 in 
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Case No. 19161.) The District Court's ruling is virtually the 
only conclusion to reach from the instruments in the record 
In 1954, Phillips owned a leasehold interest in all of 
the land embraced in the 1946 lease for a term that extended 
for as long as the Roosevelt Unit should produce. Its 1954 
lease covered only a portion of the 1946 leasehold; it made no 
mention of the 1946 lease, and there is nothing in that later 
lease to suggest that Phillips intended to shrink its 
preexistent leasehold. Further, the 1955 release stated 
unequivocally that it was not intended to affect Phillips' 
rights under the 1946 lease: 
"This instrument shall not be 
construed to effect or release of any 
rights which [Phillips] may hold in 
any lands not specifically described 
in ... Exhibit 'A' or under any oil 
and gas lease . . not specifically 
described in Exhibit 'A' whether or 
not such lease ... cover[s] any 
lands described in Exhibit 'A'." 
(R. 74 in Case No. 19161.) Not only was it against Phillips' 
obvious interest to effect a merger of its 1946 leasehold into 
the 1954 lease; Phillips explicitly negated any intention of 
disturbing the 1946 lease. Under Utah law, these facts dispose 
of the merger issue. 
In Chausse v. BE-nLoU~rl_a_rid. 71 Utah 586, 268 P.781 
(1928), this Court considered the legal sufficiency of a 
pleading precisely analogous to appellants' merger claim 
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Plaintiff there alleged that defendant's mortgages on real 
pruperty merged into defendant's subsequently acquired legal 
~itle in fee. The district court dismissed the complaint, and 
the Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the alleged merger 
would have been against the manifest interests of defendant. 
The Supreme Court quoted another authority with approval on the 
question of intention: 
"The intention and interest of the 
party who unites the two estates in 
himself will determine whether or not a 
merger takes place. Where a mortgage 
incumbrancer becomes the owner of the 
legal title ... a merger will not be 
held to take place if it be apparent 
that it was not the intention of the 
owner, or if, in the absence of any 
intention, the merger would be against 
his manifest interest." 
71 Utah at 591, 268 P. at 783. Accord: O'Reilly v. McLean, 84 
Utah 551, 559, 37 P.2d 770, 773 (1934). Modern courts have 
adopted the same rule. See, ~. Anderson v. Section II, 
Inc, 626 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Wash. App. 1981) ("[T]he courts will 
not compel a merger of estates where the party in whom the two 
interests are vested does not intend such a merger to take 
place, or where it would be inimical to the interest of the 
party in whom the several estates have united."); Strike v. 
Trrns-West D_iscciunt ~Q_l:J2., 155 Cal. Rptr. 132, 137, 92 Cal. 
Pr Id 740, 742 (1979) ("The question is one of intention, 
""!or presumed, of the person in whom the interests are 
'I ed "). 
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More fundamentally, the doctrine of merger permits a 
smaller estate to merge into a larger. but not the opposite 
See, e.g .. Olivas v. Zambrano. 543 S W ~d 180, 182 (Tex C1·; 
App. 1976) ("Where a greater estate and a lesser estate are 
acquired by the same person, the lesser is absorbed by the 
greater and the estates become merged."); Tri-Bullion Corp. v. 
American Smelting & Rfg. Co., 277 P.2d 293, 296 (N.M. 1954) 
("[W]hen the same party becomes the owner of both a large and a 
small estate in the same property, they merge and the smaller 
estate becomes extinct."). As one commentator has said, "A 
greater estate can never be merged into a smaller, and if any 
estate is to be extinguished, it must be the smaller." P.W. 
Lear, "Lurking Title Problems," 25 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 
18-1, at 18-4 (1979). 
Since it was against Phillips' obvious interest and 
expressed intention to effect a merger, and since, in any 
event, appellants' theory would stand the doctrine of merger on 
its head. the District Court's judgment should be affirmed. 
At pages 34 through 38 of their brief in Case No. 
19161, appellants make the additional arguments that the 1954 
lease was either a novation or a "surrender" of Phillips' 
preexisting leasehold. Neither of these claims appeared in the 
Amended Complaint. Appellants attempted to amend their amendf' 
complaint, fifteen days after judgment w3s entered against 
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Lhem. to state a claim for novation based on the 1954 lease. 
(R 341 in Case No. 19161.) Appellants never presented their 
claim for "surrender" to the District Court, and it appears in 
their brief on appeal for the first time. The established rule 
of this Court, of course, prohibits consideration of theories 
of recovery that were not presented to the trial court. See, 
~. General Appliance Corp. v. Haw, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 238, 
242, 516 P.2d 346, 348 (1973). The same rule should apply here. 
The District Court correctly denied appellants' 
belated motion to amend the amended complaint to add a claim 
for novation. In Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 623 
(1960), this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of a 
motion to amend the complaint after entry of summary judgment 
in defendant's favor. The Court said: 
"The proposed unverified amendment does 
not present a new theory, nor does it 
contradict or explain the materials in 
support of defendant's motion for 
summary judgment .... While Rule 
lS(a), U.R.C.P., provides that leave to 
amend 'shall be freely given when 
justice so requires,' the liberality of 
the rule is not without limit, 
particularly when nothing new or of 
substance is contained in the proposed 
amendment." 
10 Utah 2d at 270. 351 P 2d at 637. Similarly, Professor Moore 
i' "' mn1ented on the identical federal rule as follows: 
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"The allowance of an amendment after 
dismissal, however, lies within the 
sound discretion of the trial court, and 
the court may properly deny leave to 
amend where plaintiff has had several 
opportunities to state a claim and has 
not been able to do so, or where the 
proposed amendment would not remedy the 
deficiencies of the original pleading." 
3 Moore's Federal Practice ~15.10 (1982). 
At best, appellants' novation claim is repetitive of 
their merger claim; at worst, the claim is a misuse of the 
doctrine of novation. As the term is usually used. "novation" 
applies "to a transaction in which the substituted contract has 
a new party.'' 15 Williston on Contracts §1865 at p.582 (3rd 
ed. 1972). "Merger," on the other hand, is the term 
"ordinarily used to cover contracts between the same parties 
which discharge prior obligations." Id. Thus the doctrine of 
merger, and not novation, applies to the 1954 lease. if any 
such doctrine applies at all. More importantly, the courts 
have been just as cautious in novation cases as in merger cases 
to insist upon proof that all of the parties clearly assented 
to the substitution of the new contract for the old. ~e~ 
~, Tr i-St~te Oil__ Tool ~ndu_st r ie~ In~.-~~MC _ _Ine rgi_e_§_, 
Inc., 561 P.2d 714, 716 (Wyo 1977) (holding. as a matter of 
law, that no novation occurred because "unless it is the clear 
intention of the parties concerned to extinguish the old 
obligation by substitution of the new one. a novation has not 
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heen effected."). For the same reasons that appellants' merger 
:l31rn was correctly dismissed their novation theory must also 
te reJected. 
The same must be said for appellants' new claim that 
"by acceptance of this 1954 lease, [Phillips] surrendered what 
interest it claimed in 1946 under the 1946 lease .... " 
A~nts Brief in Case No. 19161, at p. 35. In Diamanti v. 
~~~t. 68 Utah 582, 251 P.373 (1926), the only Utah case urged 
by appellants in support of this theory, the facts were 
strikingly different from the undisputed facts of the present 
case In Diamanti, the parties' second lease explicitly 
cancelled the old lease. 68 Utah at 583, 251 P. at 374. With 
this fact in mind the Court held that new consideration for the 
second lease was not necessary because "the release of one 
party is the consideration for the release of the other." Id. 
In the present case, to repeat, the 1954 lease (covering only a 
part of the 1946 leasehold) made no mention of the 1946 lease, 
~hich the parties continued to perform and acknowledge. Just 
as importantly, Phillips explicitly negated its intention to 
release its rights under the 1946 lease. 
V. 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
APPELLANTS' CLAIM FOR. AN ORD~--­
DECLARING A PARTIAL:. EXPiR,A'_TION OF THE 
19:..6 LEASE 
. -
Jn the Fourth Cause of Action of the Amended Complaint 
1se No 19161, apellants alleged that the 1946 lease 
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expired in 1952 as to lands excluded from the Roosevelt Unit 
participating area. (R. 46 in Case No 19161 Although this 
claim now appears in appellants' brief in a considerably 
embelished form (see pages 38 to 43 of Appellants' Brief in 
Case No. 19161), the argument remains essentially the same. 
Appellants assert correctly that the Roosevelt Unit excluded a 
portion of the 1946 leasehold. Appellants also correctly note 
that the Roosevelt Unit Agreement required Phillips to continue 
delay rental payments on the excluded lands. They conclude 
from this (1) that the effect of these circumstances was to 
"segregate" the 1946 leasehold into unitized and non-unitized 
portions, and (2) that the lease expired at the end of the 
primary term as to the non-unitized segment of the leasehold 
The District Court dismissed this claim on the ground that 
paragraph 12 of the 1946 lease explicitly extends the entire 
leasehold for the duration of production on the Roosevelt 
Unit. (R. 259 in Case No. 19161.) 
Appellants' central contention on appeal is that 
"[t)he Unit Agreement does not require holding lands outside 
the unit beyond the primary term." AJlJl~l_lants_'_Jlr_itl in Case 
No. 19161 at p. 42. Appellants could not be more clearly 
mistaken. Paragraph 13 of the Unit Agreement provides for the 
continued payment of delay rentals on non-unitized tracts as 
the means by which "each lease which is committed he1e' 
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ma]' be continued in effect beyond the primary term." (R. 141 
, ,., ,:ase No 19161.) If there exists any question concerning 
the matter, paragraph 12 of the 1946 lease itself is 
dispositive. Paragraph 12 authorized Phillips to unitize "all 
or any part" of the leasehold, and further provided that, in 
the event of unitization, "this lease shall not terminate or 
expire during the life" of the Unit. (R. 67-68 in Case No. 
19161.) Both the lease and the Unit Agreement treat the 
leasehold as an entirety for purposes of extending the term of 
the lease. Neither instrument evidences the intention to 
"segregate" the leasehold into two estates, one of which would 
terminate before the other. 
Appellants' arguments on this point do not cite a 
single authority in support of their position. The reason is 
that virtually all of the authorities are squarely against 
them. For example, in Mize v. Exxon Corp., 640 F.2d 637 (5th 
Cir. 1981), the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment in 
the lessee's favor against the lessor's contention that unit 
production did not extend the primary term of the lease as to 
lands outside the unit. The court of appeals said: 
"A plethora of cases have firmly 
established the doctrine that 
operations conducted on any part of 
unitized acreage, even though not 
on the land under the lease in 
question, fulfill the indivisible 
obligation of the lessee and hold 
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the entire lease beyond the primary 
term. This result has been 
affirmed whether the leased tract 
lies entirely within the unit 
[citations omitted], or only 
partially within the unit 
[citations omitted]. We are aware 
of only one jurisdiction which has 
declined to adopt this rule 
[citing] Texas Gulf Producing Co. 
v. Griffith, 218 Miss. 109, 65 
So.2d 447 (1953)." 
640 F.2d at 640. Accord, e.g.: Shown v. Getty Oil Co., 645 
S.W.2d 555, 560 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Kuehne v. Samedan Oil 
~. 626 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Wyo. 1981); Somers v. Harris Trust 
& Sav. Bank, 566 P.2d 775, 778-79 (Kan. App. 1977); Brixey v. 
Union Oil Co., 283 F. Supp. 353, 359 (W.D. Ark. 1968); Texaco, 
Inc. v. Letterman, 343 S.W.2d 726, 732-33 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1961); Trawick v. Castleberry, 275 P.2d 292, 294 (Okla. 1954). 
See also Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 123 Utah 123, 135, 255 P.2d 
989, 995 (1953) (stating that if oil operations on one of two 
leased parcels satisfied the requirements of the lease for 
extension of the term as to that parcel, the same operations 
would likewise extend the lease as to the other parcel); 2 W.L. 
Summers, Law of Oil & Gas §302.1 (1966). Significantly, 
Williams and Myers interpret a lease provision identical to 
paragraph 12 of the 1946 lease as providing "that operations on 
or production from any tract included within a unit shall be 
taken and accepted as such drilling and production under the 
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terms of each of the leases as to all of the acreage under such 
1e~;e whether included within a unit or not." 6 H. R. Williams 
\ '· J 11Yers, Oil & Gas Law §952 (1981) (emphasis added). 
As these authorities indicate, the arrangement created 
by the 1946 lease and the Unit Agreement boils down to three 
simple propositions.· First, participation of the leased 
premises in Roosevelt Unit production is deemed, for purposes 
of the lease, to be production from the leased premises. 
(Lease 112; Unit Agreement '16(b).) Second, production from 
any portion of the leased premises is sufficient to hold the 
lease, in its entirety, for the duration of production. (Lease 
110 Third, during the period in which all or any portion of 
the leased premises participates in Unit production, the lease 
continues in effect in its entirety. (Lease 112; Unit 
Agreement ,116(d).) Since the 1946 lease has participated in 
royalties from production from 1950 to the present, the entire 
lease remains in effect to the present, as a matter of law. 
The District Court correctly dismissed the Fourth Cause of 
Action in Case No. 19161. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal is important to all oil and gas producers 
·~ Utah because it challenges the legal assumptions on which 
bJ,e conducted business for decades. The established law 
t~r oil producing jurisdictions, for example, assures 
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